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On Replaceability 
Peter Singer has shown how the 
principle of utility, which enjoins us 
(roughly) to maximize to balance of 
nonmoral good over nonmoral evil, 
justifies 'humane' treatment of ani­
mals. 1 An excellent case against fac­
tory farming, blood sports, and cur­
rent methods of an imal laboratory 
experimentation has been made on 
utilitarian grounds. However, must a 
utilitarian be opposed to all exploita­
tion of animals' lives for human pleas­
u re or profit? Not according to the 
'replacement argument,' which tells us 
that: 
1.	 We ought to maximize util­
ity (i.e., to maximize the 
balance of nonmoral good 
over nonmoral evil). 
2.	 Utility would be maximized 
if one were to use an ani­
mal and kill it (for food or 
research or anything else) 
provided that the following 
conditions are met: 
(a)·	 the life of the animal is 
on balance a Iife worth 
living, 
(b)	 the animal otherwise 
would have no life at all 
(would not exist), 
(c)	 the sufferi ng of the 
animal and those close to 
it as a result of such 
use and disposal is elimi­
nated or minimized, and 
(d)	 the· animal will be 
replaced, at or after 
death, by another animal 
for whom conditions (a), 
(b), (c), and (d) hold. 
3.	 Therefore, we ought to use 
and kill animals provided 
that conditions (a) (d) 
are met. 2 
Classical utilita rian ism is committed 
to this argument. As Singer says, it 
. . rega rds sentient beings 
as valuable only in so far as 
they ma ke possible the exis­
tence of intrinsically valuable 
experiences like pleasure. It 
is as if sentient beings are 
receptacles of something valua­
ble and it does not matter if a 
receptacle gets broken, so long 
as there is another receptacle 
to which the contents can be 
transferred without any getting 
spilt. 3 
While it IS clear that captive ani­
mals would be vastly better off under 
such an arrangement than they are 
now, is it really the case that 'hu­
mane' farms and labs are morally jus­
tifiable? Moreover, what a re the 
implications of this argument for the 
treatment of humans?4 How can one 
determine whether a normative ethical 
theory has gone too fa r? Some brief 
remarks about the nature of ethical 
justification must be made before these 
questions can be answered. 
The major metaethical theories have 
different implications about the precise 
kind of justification normative ethical 
claims can have. According to natu­
ralistic and nonnaturalistic metaethical 
theories, ethical claims are factual 
assertions which can in principle be 
shown true or false. (Naturalism 
implies that ethical language users 
believe there are natural ethical prop­
erty instances; nonnaturalism implies 
that ethical language users believe 
there are nonnatural ethical property 
instances.) Noncognitivist metaethical 
theories, on the· other hand, imply 
that ethical claims are not (at all or 
merely, depending on the type of 
noncognitivism) factual and thus are 
neither true nor false. Some of these 
major theories are much more plausible 
than others, of course, but it would 
go beyond the scope of this paper to 
discuss thei r respective merits. 5 
Suffice it to say that it is fa r from 
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obvious that ethical claims can be 
given a straightforward justification. 
This does not mean, however, that 
it is doubtful that they can be justi­-
fied at all. Ethical claims can be 
rationally accepted or rejected even if 
noncognitivism is true. Ethical claims 
are. standardly discounted if they fail 
to be clearly thought out, fully 
informed, and impartial. (It is crucial 
to note that empathy [vividly imagin­-
ing oneself in another's position] is 
necessary for a fully informed judg­-
ment about matters that concern sen­-
tient beings. It is a way of gaining 
highly relevant information about the 
effects of actions on such beings. 
One must of course empathize equally 
vividly with all sentient beings which 
an action significantly concerns if one 
is to be impartial.) All the major 
metaethical theories are compatible 
with these facts, as of cou rse they 
must be in order to have a chance of 
being correct. Even if ethical claims 
are not assertions about the instantia­-
tion of natural or nonnatural proper­-
ties in acts, entities, or states of 
affai rs, they a re made about acts, 
entities, or states of affairs. If one's 
thin king is muddled, or if one is 
ignorant of relevant facts, or if one is 
biased and thus selectively aware of 
only some of the relevant facts, one's 
claim is unjustified: one does not 
know what one's claim is about. 
Thus, even if there are no ethical 
facts, one's ethical judgments can be 
justified if they are shown to be qual­-
ified by being clear, fully informed, 
and impartial.' This also applies to 
sets of ethical claims. They too must 
be clear, coherent, informed, and 
impartial. If an ethical claim or a set 
of ethical claims is not qualified in 
these respects, it is discounted. 
This method of justification,' which 
I will follow R. B. Brandt in calling 
'the qualified attitude method, '6 gives 
us a way of rationally arguing about 
ethical claims. It also explains why 
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qualified ethical 'intuitions' are the 
touchstones of normative ethical theo­-
ries. Without them, such theories 
could neither be formulated nor 
tested. The qualified attitude method 
does, however, have one difficulty. 
It is theoretically possible that indi­-
viduals with equally qualified ethical 
attitudes will disagree. Were this to 
occur, ethical argumentation must 
cease. Nevertheless, I would agree 
with W. K. Frankena  that such a 
disag reement is no more than a theo­-
retical possibility. 7 It is extraordi­-
narily difficult to come up with an 
ethical disagreement in which both 
sides a re equally qual ified. Fran ke­-
na's assertion will, however, .be tested 
later in this paper. With this back­-
ground in mind, let us now return to 
the replacement a rgument and the 
implications by which it will be tested. 
We will begin by considering a 
very serious implication of the 
replacement argument: if animals are 
replaceable, so are human beings with 
comparable characteristics in like cir­-
cumstances. I will not here repeat 
the extensive argumentation by phi­-
losophers for the conclusion that 
preferential treatment for humans who 
differ in no relevant respects from 
animals cannot be justified and is in 
fact speciesist (hence not impartial). 
Many attempts have been made to jus­-
tify such preferential treatment, but 
in my judgment none has succeeded. 8 
If conditions (a) - (d) can be satis­-
fied by morons, stocking and using 
them for food or experimentation is no 
more or less reprehensible than doing 
so with animals. Thus, if the ethical 
belief "Morons should not be raised, 
made into stew or used as lab sub­-
jects, then replaced, but it is permis­-
sible to treat animals in this way so 
long as utility is maximized" is shown 
to be unjustified (unqualified), one is 
left to discard half of this conjunc­-
tion. 
Most individuals facing this i  choice 
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would revise their beliefs about the 
treatment of animals rather than opt 
for moron stocking. I believe such a 
choice to be vey reasonable. If one 
fully considers the moron stocking 
scena rio ina clea r, empathetic, 
impartial way, I find it hard to see 
how one can accept it. Unfortu­-
nately, some philosophers do not find 
it so hard to see and appear to be 
willing to accept such a scenario. 
Peter Singer has (courageously or 
outrageously, depending . on one's 
viewpoint) taken this position. He 
suggests that if the replacement argu­-
ment cannot be defeated "it is our 
attitudes to mentally defective human 
beings that are in need of reconsider'" 
ation:" 9 
This involves holding that 
mental defectives do not have a 
right to life, and therefore 
might be killed for food--if we 
. should develop a taste for 
human flesh--or (and this 
really might appeal to some 
people) for the purpose of sci­-
entific experimentation. 10 
Singer seems in no way horrified by 
this prospect. Elsewhere he says that 
even nondefective human infants "are 
as replaceable as merely conscious 
an imals. "11 What can one say to a 
philosopher like Singer who is willing 
to make his ethical bel iefs consistent 
and impartial by applying the replace­-
ability principle in this nonspeciesist 
way? 
One could try to argue that Sing­-
er's position, though apparently 
impartial, is not sufficiently clear or 
well informed. Such a response to 
Singer would be very difficult to make 
out and I am loathe to try it here. I 
prefer to develop another objection to 
the replacement argument which I do 
not think Singer can successfully 
cou nter, an objection wh ich wi II have 
the indirect result of rejecting the 
replacement argument for defective 
humans. Before proceeding with this 
new objection, however, let it be 
noted that those who, unlike Singer, 
do not accept the replaceability of 
defective humans must 
replacement argument. 
reject the 
The next objection 
replacement argument as 
is this. 
it stands 
The 
has 
an implication which would horrify 
Singer. It applies to any sentient 
creatu re for whom conditions (a) 
(d) are satisfied. It follows that even 
normal humans are replaceable, so 
long as utility is maximized. As 
Singer says, "Situations in which the 
argument would apply to humans might 
not be common, but they could 
occur."12 Even those who are willing 
to accept the raising, eating, etc., 
and replacement of defective humans, 
bal k at the notion that normal nonde­-
fective humans are in the same boat. 
One who is disturbed by this implica­-
tion must eiher reject the replacement 
argument wholly, i.e., for animals and 
defective humans as well as normal 
humans, or opt to restrict the 
replacement argument in such a way 
that it cannot apply to normal 
humans. Since classical utilitarianism 
leads to the replacement argument, 
either choice implies its rejection as 
well. 
Singer chooses to replace classical 
utilitarianism with another version of 
utilitarianism which he believes allows 
him to restrict the replacement argu­-
ment. He first rejects a tempting 
nonclassical-utilitarianism solution to 
the problem, 'the prior existence 
view,' according to which the princi­-
ple of utility applies only to beings 
already in existence. 13 Although on 
such a view utility could obviously 
never be maximized by replacement of 
sentient beings, it is impossible to 
avoid the conclusion that the solution 
is arbitrary as well as contrary to the 
spirit of utilitarianism. To say that 
the principle of utility does not even 
apply to those unborn is to open a 
hornets' nest of difficulties. The dif­-
ficulty which troubles Singer is the 
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implication that it would not be wrong 
knowingly to conceive a child whose 
physical defects would condemn it to a 
brief life of wretched suffering. 14 
would put the criticism more gener­-
ally. A view which implies that 
future generations simply do not count 
in their own right (i.e., that we 
should consider them only insofar as 
they would affect those now existing) 
clashes with our qualified ethical intu­-
itions. Classical utilitarianism, which 
bids us maximize the balance of total 
utility over disutility, quite properly 
does extend the principle of utility to 
those who do not yet exist. Instead 
of accepting the prior ex istence view, 
Singer chooses to adopt a utilitarian­-
ism which, like classical· utilitarianism, 
does not restrict the princple of util­-
ity to those who already exist. This 
view is 'preference utilitarianism.' 
According to it, utility is directly 
assigned to the preferences of beings 
affected by actions, not merely to 
their states of consciousness. Killing 
a being which has a preference to 
continue living creates, other things 
being equal, more disutility than kill­-
ing a being which has no such pref­-
erence. 
It follows, Singer believes, that on 
preference utilitarianism a living being 
who prefers to live will be favored 
over its merely potential replacement, 
which can have no preference for life 
since it does not yet exist. 1s This is 
so even if the being is painlessly 
killed all unsuspecting in its sleep: 
even in that case, a preference has 
been extinguished. The total amount 
of happiness or satisfaction, etc., 
including that which a replacement 
would have, is still taken into 
account: it is the existing being's 
preference to live which tips the 
scales in its favor. However, if an 
existing being has no preference for 
continued life, its demise will not cre­-
<;It" extra disutility, If it WQuid not 
otherwIse have been alive, has lived a 
pleasant life, has had its suffering 
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and what suffering others undergo on 
its account minimized, and will be 
replace by another bei ng who wou Id 
live and die under the same condi­-
tions, no preference utilitarian objec­-
tion would, believes Singer, be made. 
What beings, according to Singer, can 
have pleasant lives yet not prefer to 
live? Beings who have no concept of 
self: 'merely conscious' bei ngs. 
Those who can have a preference for 
continued life must be self-conscious. 
Indeed, Singer apparently takes self­-
consciousness to be sufficient as well 
as necessary for such a preference. 
He d raws the followi ng impl ication for 
preference utilitarianism: 
Self-conscious beings therefore 
are not mere receptacles for 
containing a certain quantity of 
pleasu re, and a re not replace­-
able nonself-conscious 
beings are replaceable. 16 
The replacement argument is accord­-
ingly restricted to beings who are not 
self-con sciou s, a class wh ich excl udes 
normal humans. In this way Si nger 
believes he has avoided an unaccepta­-
ble consequence of the orginal 
replacement argument. 
However, serious problems afflict 
this attempt simultaneously to save 
and restrict the replacement a rgu­-
ment. Fi rst, let us for the moment 
not question the assumption that 
self-conscious beings are irreplaceable 
on preference utilitarianism. Now let 
us ask if there are any conscious 
beings who are 'merely'r conscious, 
with no concept whatever of self. 
Certainly many severely defective 
humans show signs of self-conscious­-
ness. They perform actions, have 
goals, show no tendency to confuse 
themselves with table-legs, etc. Mon­-
keys, apes, dogs, cats, horses, pigs, 
sheep, etc., likewise exhibit behavior 
which would be hard to explain with­-
out the postu lation of self-conscious­-
ness, Even chickens seem to be, 
however dimly,. aware of themselves. 
They too have no tendency to confuse 
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themselves with the rest of the world. 
Furthermore, even the infant members 
of these species exhibit such signs. 
Though Singer is predictably not at 
all distu rbed by the excl usion of adu It 
monkeys, apes, and other 'higher' 
animals from the class to which the 
replacement argument applies, he con­-
tinues to think that many sentient 
beings will not be excluded (e.g., 
normal as well as defective human 
infants, probably chickens,· and cer­-
tainly animals lower on· the evolution­-
ary scale than chickens). 17 It is 
highly doubtful that all these beings 
can be made out to lack self-con­-
sciousness of any kind. Clams and 
oysters may not be self-conscious, but 
the replacement argument would lose 
most of its point if it were restricted 
to them. (Although tasty, they ma ke 
poor experimental subjects. ) 
Perhaps Singer would reply that 
although babies and chickens cou ld be 
said to be self-conscious, they are not 
self-conscious enough to have a pref­-
erence for continued life. (He would 
then have to take self-consciousness 
as such to be merely necessary for 
the preference for continued life.) 
But on what grounds are we to 
declare that a baby or chicken has no 
preference for continued life? What is 
'life' but a series of experiences and 
what is a preference for continued life 
but the desi re for more experiences? 
Is not the seeking of pleasure and the 
avoidance of pain, clea rly exhibited 
by the beings in question, sufficient 
evidence for the desire to continue 
living? If Singer wishes to claim that 
such behavior is instinctive only he 
would find himself at odds with many 
current theorists about animal behav­-
ior. Why insist that a baby or kitten 
who seeks warmth, food, and compan­-
ionship, cannot prefer to continue liv­-
ing? 
The answer is that Singer appears 
to be thinking that an animal or 
human who prefers to live must have 
a very soph isticated conception of 
itself. It must conceive of itself as "a 
distinct entity with a possible futu re 
existence. "18 If it has a more impov­-
erished conception of itself it "can­-
not," as he puts it, "have a prefer­-
ence about its own futu re 
existence."19 But to demand this 
degree of sophistication is surely 
unwarranted. I suspect that this 
demand has its origin in Singer's 
uncritical acceptance of a faulty infer­-
ence by Michael Tooley, a philosopher 
whose views on self-consciousness 
Singer uses to support preference 
utilitarianism. 20 Tooley argues that 
1.	  One can have a right to 
life only if one is capable 
of desiring life. 
2.	 One can be capable of 
desiring life only if one has 
a concept of life. 
3.	  The kind of life is question 
is being a continuing sub­-
ject of experiences and 
other mental states. 
4.	  Therefore one can have a 
right to life only if one has 
a concept of bei ng a con­-
tinuing subject of experi­-
ences and other mental 
states. 21 
The inference to (3), as W. S. Pluhar 
has pointed out,22 commits the inten­-
tional fallacy. One can desire life 
without thinking of it in these highly 
sophisticated terms just as one can 
desire to meet Archibald Cox without 
thinking of him as a Harvard law pro­-
fessor. There is therefore no reason 
to deny that sentient beings who 
behave. as if they prefer to live do 
prefer to live. The replacement 
argument as restricted by Singer 
appears to be vastly more restricted 
than he believes and thus looses its 
point .. 
Now, however, an even·more seri­-
ous objection can be raised. The 
first objection to the preference utilit­-
arian version of the replacement argu­-
ment, just spelled out above, did not 
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challenge the assumption that prefer­-
ence utilitarianism would imply that 
self-conscious beings are irreplace­-
able. We saw that the argument, 
given this assumption, appl ies to very 
few sentient creatu res. A much more 
serious problem arises for Singer 
when we examine this assumption. It 
tu rns out to be simply false that 
preference utilitarianism implies the 
irreplaceability of self-conscious 
bei ngs. 
The problem is this. The replace­-
ment for the painlessly, fearlessly 
dispatched self-conscious being also 
has a preference for continued life. 
It is not different in th is respect from 
its predecessor. If the new prefer­-
ence and the old preference a re equal 
in strength, they must be assigned 
the same utility; therefore, preference 
utilitarianism does not favor the 
replacee over the replacer rega rdless 
of whether the former is self-con­-
scious. 
Perhaps Singer would try to avoid 
this (for his purposes, disastrous) 
implication by arguing that a being 
which does not yet exist (the. repla­-
cer) cannot have any preferences. 
All such preferences, he might say, 
are potential only. There is evidence 
that Singer would reply in that way. 
He argues that . normal infants are 
replaceable because they as yet have 
no preference to continue living: 
Potential self-consciousness is 
not enough, for a potentially 
self-conscious being has never 
desired to go on living. 23 
Similarly, an as yet nonexistent being 
has no actual preference for continued 
life. Thus, Singer could reply, pref­-
erence utilitarianism does indeed favor 
the existent being with a preference 
to continue living ovel' any nonexis­-
tent replacement. 
However, this line of reply is 
actually closed to Singer, because it 
presupposes an amalgam of preference 
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utilitarianism with a view he rejects: 
the prior existence view. The reader 
will recall that in seeking to render 
the replacement argument inapplicable 
to normal, self-conscious humans he 
rejected the prior existence view 
(which does not assign utility to the 
states of mind, etc., of nonexistent 
beings) in favor of preference utilita­-
rianism. 24 The prior existence view 
was rejected because it did not imply 
the wrongness of deliberately conceiv­-
ing an incurably and painfully 
deformed child who would die before· 
his second bi rthday. Suppose that 
the child's mind is unimpaired. We 
would then think it probable that he 
would develop a preference for nonex­-
istence. Yet such a preference would 
simply not count if Singer were to try 
to escape the disastrous implication in 
the way I have suggested. Thus, his 
view would be subject to the same 
objection as the view he has rejected . 
If Singer were to reply that he 
would take the misery of the child 
into account and thus condemn its 
deliberate conception, then he ought 
to take its potential preferences into 
account as well. Its misery is also 
merely potential, after all. And in 
that case the preferences which any 
nonexistent being will have ought to 
be taken into account. Thus, the 
original objection reemerges: prefer­-
ence utilitarianism does not favor the 
self-conscious replacee over its self­-
conscious replacer if we can expect 
the replacer's preference to live to be 
at least as strong as the replacee's.25 
I see no way in which Singer can 
consistently avoid this  objection. 
We have seen that when the 
assumption that preference utilitarian­-
ism implies the irreplaceability of 
self-conscious beings is not ques­-
tioned, the replacement argument 
applies to hardly any beings at all. 
When the assumption is questioned, 
the argument applies to all sentient 
beings. Both alternatives are 
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unacceptable to Singer. Therefore, 
his attempt to restrict the replacement 
argument to nonself-conscious animals 
and humans has thoroughly defeated 
itself. 
In the absence of any other plausi­-
ble new utilitarian version of the 
replacement argument which would 
avoid the above entanglements, one is 
entitled to conclude that the replace­-
ment argument does indeed apply even 
to normal humans. Therefore either 
the replacement argument, and utilita­-
rianism, must be rejected, or the 
implication must be accepted. It is 
now time to press the argument from 
moral consistency on proponents of 
the replacement argument. Anyone 
who, on careful, clear, impartial 
reflection, believes that it is wrong to 
create, 'humanely' use, then replace 
normal humans, will have to reject the 
replacement argument for other sen­-
tient beings as well. The principle of 
utility must then be rejected as the 
only·' basic moral principle. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that 
some utilitarians decide not to agree 
with Singer's claim that 
If we think of a living creature 
as a self-conscious i ndivid ual, 
leading its own life and with a 
desire to go on living, the 
replaceability argument holds 
Iittle appeal. 26 
It is enti rely possible that some wou Id 
prefer to accept the replaceability of 
normal humans rather that to reject 
the replacement argument and utilita­-
rianism. They would probably argue 
that they a re not impressed by an 
appeal to ethical intuitions, that just 
as they do not shy from the thesis 
that defective humans a re replaceable, 
they are willing to accept the replace­-
ability of humans like themselves. 
"Why," they might say, "should we 
abandon utilitarianism rather than 
abandon an ethical intuition?" Can 
one ,'easonably counter such a draco­-
nian moral consistency? 
I believe one can, by appealing to 
a pragmatic version of the argument 
from moral consistency. The principle 
of utility is itself arrived at by appeal 
to ethical intuitions. Various versions 
of utilitarianism are likewise accepted 
or rejected by utilitarians by such 
appeals. For example, Singer rejects 
the prior existence view because it 
has an implication "we would think.. 
.wrong;"27 similarly, he raises doubts 
about classical utilitarianism on the 
grounds that "all this is, again, very 
much at odds with our ordinary moral 
convictions. "28 Moreover, utilitarians 
have devoted a good deal of effort to 
the task of showing some version of 
utilitarianism consistent with standard 
intuitions about lying, promise keep­-
ing, and punishment of the innocent. 
My point here is not merely to charge 
any utilitarians who accept the impli­-
cations of the replacement argument 
with inconsistency. I believe they are 
entirely right to appeal to ethical 
intuitions at these crucial points. 
They are also right to insist that the 
intuitions appealed to be qualified. 
As mentioned earlier, without such 
appeals ethical theories can neither be 
formulated nor tested. These reflec­-
tions do however suggest that a util­-
itarian who relies on clear, informed, 
impartial ethical intuitions in trying to 
formulate his theory but who rejects 
them when they run counter to his 
theory is guilty of a pragmatic, if not 
formal, inconsistency. (If a utilita­-
rian can show that the ethical intui­-
tion that it is wrong to create, use, 
and replace a normal human being is 
not qualified in the above respects, 
he is not guilty of this charge. How­-
ever, no such thing has been shown.) 
If then the principle of utility is, 
after careful moral reflection, not 
taken to be the only basic moral prin­-
ciple, we must look for an additional 
principle (and thus to a deontological 
theory) which do.es square with quali­-
fied ethical intuitions concerning 
replaceability. To formulate and then 
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defend such a principle is no easy 
task. I will here confine myself to 
some brief remarks on this subject. 
Tom Regan has been trying to formu­-
late such a principle in his recent 
writings, and the results are very 
suggestive. Briefly, he a rgues that 
if sentient (or non sentient) beings 
have basic rights, they have those 
rights because they are inherently 
valuable. He spells out the "most 
noteworthy features" of inherent value 
as follows: 
1.	  If any given being (x) has 
inherent value, then x's 
hav ing val ue of t his kindis 
logically independent of any 
other being's happening to 
take an interest in or oth­-
erwise valuing x. 
2.	  X's having inherent value 
makes it improper (a sign 
of disrespect) to treat x as 
though it had value only as 
a means (i. e., only if and 
only so long as it answers 
another's needs, etc.). 
3.	  Because x's having inher­-
ent value underlies the 
obligation to treat x with 
respect, and since some­-
thing's being good-of-its­-
kind is not a plausible 
basis on which to found 
this obligation, x's being 
good-of-its-kind is logically 
distinct from x's having 
inherent· value. 29 
Regan's 'criterion of inherent val­-
ue' does seem to captu re the convic­-
tion that stocking, eating or experi­-
menting on, and then replaci ng a 
sentient creature with another just 
like it and with the same fate, is to 
treat it as instrumentally valuable. If 
the being is in fact inherently valua-
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ble, such use seems wrong I even if 
precautions have been taken to make 
the being as happy as possible. 
However, I do believe Regan errs in 
stipulating that it is treatment of an 
inherently valuable being as a means 
only that is improper. Under the 
conditions of the replacement argu­-
ment, sentient bei ngs a re not treated 
as means only: their well-being is 
taken into account in the attempt to 
maximize the balance of inherent non­-
moral value over disvalue. (Current 
treatment of animals, by contrast, 
comes very close to treatment of them 
as means only.) On the other hand, 
it is clear that stocking, using, dis­-
posing of, and replacing sentient cre­-
atures, however benevolently this is 
done, is to treat them primarily as 
means. Therefore I' would suggest 
amending Regan's feature (2) as fol­-
lows: . 
2.	  X's having inherent value 
makes it improper (a sign 
of disrespect) to treat x as 
though it had val ue prima­-
rily as a means. 
Much work remains to be done on 
the criterion of inherent value, as 
Regan is the fi rst to say. 30 How­-
ever, if the reasoning in the earlier 
part of my paper is correct, and the 
replacement argument must indeed be 
rejected for humans and animals, the 
formulation and testing of this or some 
other principle as part of a deontolo­-
gical theory is the next order of 
business. 
Evelyn B. Pluhar
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